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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LABOR ORGANIZING IN THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE

CHARLOTTE GARDEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
How will big data and the rise of sophisticated and accessible workplace
surveillance techniques affect union organizing? This Article discusses recent
advances in workplace surveillance technology, including systems designed to
collect vast quantities of data about what goes on in a workplace: when
employees leave their work stations; to whom they talk; what they type; how
quickly they complete tasks; even their mood. Moreover, the rise of “big data”
means that employers can analyze this data to obtain an increasingly detailed
and sophisticated picture of what workers are doing and how they feel about
their work.
While these new technologies raise a host of privacy and other concerns, 1
this Article focuses on some of the ways they could chill workers’ collective
action. Most obviously, workers may fear that anything they say could be
electronically overheard by a system designed to help employers identify
malcontents and agitators. Beyond that, systems designed to juice every ounce
of productivity out of workers could simply leave them without the downtime at
work that could lead to sharing information about their own workplace
experiences and building trust. Yet the National Labor Relations Act (the
“NLRA”)—a statute drafted to protect “the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively” 2 —has remarkably little to say about much employer
surveillance. Instead, employers are mostly free to implement surveillance
measures for purposes such as promoting productivity or improving security,
even if those measures could also chill union organizing. This has been true since
the days when workplace surveillance mostly had to be accomplished by human
beings, conjuring up men in trench coats who would follow workplace rabblerousers to the union hall in the evenings. The shift to surveillance by closed* Co-Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development, and Associate Professor, Seattle
University School of Law. I am grateful for feedback on and discussion of this piece during St.
Louis University’s 2018 symposium on Law, Technology, and the Organization of Work, as well
as for excellent editing by the members of the St. Louis University Law Journal.
1. See generally, Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring Platforms
and Wearable Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for Employment and Labor
Law, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 21 (2019).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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circuit cameras and keystroke loggers placed the National Labor Relations
Board’s (the “NLRB”) surveillance doctrine under stress—but omnipresent
listening devices that collect mass amounts of data to be analyzed by computer
could render that doctrine nearly useless.
This Article discusses recent advances in employers’ surveillance
capabilities, and what they mean for union organizing. Part II discusses new
workplace surveillance technology. Then, Part III discusses the (limited) extent
to which employer surveillance can constitute an unfair labor practice. Part IV
draws the previous two parts together, arguing that the NLRA is not an adequate
response to the unique challenges to collective action that are posed by new
surveillance technology.
II. MODERN WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE
Like many other aspects of work, technology has transformed worker
surveillance. Employers have at their disposal an increasingly sophisticated set
of tools with which to monitor every aspect of employees’ work—and
sometimes their private lives, too.
It is already commonplace and common knowledge that employers can use
keyloggers and other tracking software to monitor what their employees type,
what websites they visit and how much time they spend there, and more. 3 But
employer surveillance need not stop at employees’ desks. Employers can also
rely on closed circuit cameras to learn when employees get up and walk away
from the computer, or they can require employees to use radio-frequency
identification badges to enter rooms on the employer’s premises—thereby
creating a log of each employee’s locations throughout the day. 4 Further, many
of these tools are not easily detectable by employees, unless employers decide
that it is in their interest to be forthright about their workplace monitoring: just
as a homeowner might post a security system logo in the window in the hope of
deterring burglars, an employer might predict that employees’ awareness that
they are being monitored might itself change their behavior.
This technology reached maturity years ago, and it shows no sign of falling
out of favor; to the contrary, its use seems to be on the rise. Surveys of employer
behavior have obvious limitations, but for what they are worth, they generally
reflect increasing surveillance of employees. For example, in a 2007 survey by
the American Management Association and the ePolicy Institute, two thirds of
the 304 employer respondents stated that they monitored their employees’ use

3. See Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 221, 262–63 (1996).
4. Id.
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of the Internet, and blocked access to certain websites. 5 That same survey
showed that nearly half of respondents used keystroke loggers and reviewed
their employees’ computer files, with most of these employers providing
advance notice of this monitoring. 6 Further, when compared to earlier versions
of the same survey, this study suggests that employer surveillance is on the rise. 7
In addition, employers now have at their disposal increasingly sophisticated,
subtle, and effective means of surveilling their employees’ actions,
communications, and even attitudes, both inside and outside of work. For
example, a profile of the Silicon Valley firm Humanyze recounts that both the
company’s own employees and its clients’ employees are outfitted with “a
microphone that picks up whether they are talking to one another; Bluetooth and
infrared sensors to monitor where they are; and an accelerometer to record when
they move.” 8 That technology is capable of yielding “metrics such as time spent
with people of the same sex, activity levels and the ratio of time spent speaking
versus listening.” 9 Another company sells a “happiness meter,” which can “infer
mood levels from physical movement.” 10 And a third takes email monitoring to
a new level by scanning employees’ email to understand how their “sentiment
changes over time.” 11
These technologies and the comprehensive information they offer about
what employees do at work are not limited to office environments. Inviting
inevitable comparisons to the “time and motion studies” that are key to
Taylorism, 12 Amazon reportedly patented a wearable device designed to track
the speed and accuracy with which warehouse workers packed boxes. 13 The
5. The Latest on Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, AM. MGMT. ASS’N (Sept. 3, 2018,
3:32 PM), https://www.amanet.org/training/articles/the-latest-on-workplace-monitoring-andsurveillance.aspx [https://perma.cc/PUY7-QGR8].
6. Id.
7. See National Workrights Institute, Privacy Under Siege: Electronic Monitoring in the
Workplace at 9 https://epic.org/privacy/workplace/e-monitoring.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ8T-MT
ED] (collecting various surveys from the early 2000s).
8. There Will Be Little Privacy in the Workplace of the Future, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 28,
2018), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/28/there-will-be-little-privacy-in-theworkplace-of-the-future [https://perma.cc/TP3B-BCKM].
9. Id. (However, the article states that clients are not given information about individual
employees, and that they instead receive only “team-level statistics”).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Michael C. Harper, The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the Contemporary
Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2322, 2341 (1998) (discussing the “essential aspects of Taylorism,”
which result in workers being assigned simple, repetitive tasks, the pace of which are determined
“by the speed of an assembly line or by quotas based on time and motion studies of workers by
production engineer specialists”).
13. Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a
Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/
amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/6TDQ-JTQ9].
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device could also “nudge [workers] via vibrations” when it “judged that [they]
were doing something wrong.” 14 And while news of that patent made a splash,
warehouse employees “said the company already used similar tracking
technology in its warehouses,” 15 which have—perhaps not coincidentally—
acquired reputations as punishing workplaces. 16 For its part, Walmart patented
an “audio surveillance technology that measures workers’ performance, and
could even listen to their conversations with customers at checkout.” 17
According to the patent, the system would be sensitive enough to detect the
length of a line at a cashier, or the speed at which groceries were being bagged. 18
Enterprises can also keep watch over freelancers and those who work
partially from home, raising a different set of privacy concerns. For example,
the platform Upwork “tracks hundreds of freelancers while they work by saving
screenshots, measuring the frequency of their clicks and keystrokes, and even
sometimes taking webcam photos of the workers.” 19 Upwork then uses this
information to determine how freelancers will be paid. 20 Along the same lines,
Uber introduced software designed to monitor drivers’ speed and other driving
habits—a change with potential positive implications for safety, but also
negative implications for drivers’ privacy and autonomy. 21 Countless employers
provide at least some of their employees with laptops or smartphones to take
home with them; many of these devices contain recorders and cameras that can
be triggered remotely, as well as the keyloggers and other trackers that have long
been available. Finally, some employers issue Fitbits and other fitness and health
tracking devices to their employees as part of “wellness” programs—these
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Dave Jamieson, The Life and Death of an Amazon Warehouse Temp, HUFFINGTON
POST, https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/life-and-death-amazon-temp/ (last visited
Aug. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/J2FB-RVCB]; Nina Shapiro, Under Pressure, Afraid to Take
Bathroom Breaks? Inside Amazon’s Fast-Paced Warehouse World, SEATTLE TIMES (July 2, 2018),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/under-pressure-afraid-to-take-bathroom-breaks-in
side-amazons-fast-paced-warehouse-world/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_
campaign=article_left_1.1 [https://perma.cc/PLP7-BBGM].
17. Caroline O’Donovan, Walmart’s Newly Patented Technology for Eavesdropping on
Workers Presents Privacy Concerns, BUZZFEED (Jul. 11, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/carolineodonovan/walmart-just-patented-audio-surveillance-technology-for#.gia8Mn4Vg
[https://perma.cc/LVS5-N9GW].
18. Id.
19. Caroline O’Donovan, This “Creepy” Time-Tracking Software Is Like Having Your Boss
Watch You Every Second, BUZZFEED (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
carolineodonovan/upwork-freelancers-work-diary-keystrokes-screenshot [https://perma.cc/67TZVJFQ].
20. Id.
21. Michal Addady, Uber Is Starting to Monitor Drivers for Bad Behavior, FORTUNE (June
29, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/29/uber-monitor-driving-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/TDL62LFQ].
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devices collect data about employees’ physical activity, heart rates, and sleep
patterns, including when they go to bed and get up. 22
Yet employees sometimes successfully resist new employer surveillance
regimes. For example, Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, and Jason Schultz open
their important article, Limitless Worker Surveillance, with an anecdote in which
journalists at the Daily Telegraph noticed that devices called “OccupEye” had
been installed at every workstation. 23 As the authors recount, “[e]mployees’
suspicion that OccupEye’s true purpose was mass surveillance of worker
performance quickly led to public outrage, union pressure, and, ultimately, its
ejection from the Telegraph building.” 24 Further, employees who work in
unionized workplaces will often be entitled to notice of, and an opportunity to
bargain over, the imposition of new surveillance technology, 25 giving them an
opportunity to argue for limits on both the use of employer surveillance devices,
and the purposes for which the data they gather can be used. And even nonunion employees who learn that their every move is being watched or listened
to can express their displeasure in ways that range from mass walkouts to more
subtle (and conscious or unconscious) slowdowns, to individual employees
deciding to vote with their feet by quitting. 26
However, these responses are partial solutions at best—they will work only
for employees who learn that they are being surveilled, and even then, only if
they have enough leverage to successfully resist their employers. Solving this
problem could be a job for labor law, which is intended to respond to workplace
power imbalances, but it not yet up to the challenges that surveillance
technology poses for workers’ collective action, including union organizing. The
next section discusses the limitations of the NLRB’s surveillance doctrine,
outlining the scope of labor law and describing how the NLRA fails to respond
adequately to emerging worker surveillance techniques.

22. See Christopher Rowland, With Fitness Trackers in the Workplace, Bosses Can Monitor
Your Every Step – and Possibly More, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/with-fitness-trackers-in-the-workplace-bosses-can-monitor-your-everystep—and-possibly-more/2019/02/15/75ee0848-2a45-11e9-b011-d8500644dc98_story.html?utm
_term=.af1e92eb3841 [https://perma.cc/VW26-P9AT].
23. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance,105 CAL.
L. REV. 735, 737 (2017).
24. Id.
25. See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 515, 517 (1997) (employer committed unfair
labor practice by failing to bargain over installation of hidden surveillance cameras).
26. Recently, some employees at technology companies including Microsoft have organized
around the ethical implications of some of their employers’ projects and clients, such as US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Nitasha Tiku, Microsoft’s Ethical Reckoning is Here,
WIRED (June 18, 2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/microsofts-ethical-reckoning-ishere/ [https://perma.cc/2HUG-XQ39]. See also Martin Skladany, Technology Unions: How
Technology Employees Can Advocate for Internet Freedom, Privacy, Intellectual Property Reform,
and the Greater Good, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 821 (2016).
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III. SURVEILLANCE AND THE NLRA 27
The NLRA protects the right of most private sector employees to “form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 28 Neither that core
right nor the unfair labor practices enumerated in Section 8 of the NLRA 29
addresses employees’ privacy or employer surveillance explicitly. Still, it seems
unimaginable that unlimited employer scrutiny of employees’ collective action
could be consistent with the core of the NLRA’s protections, especially when
employees are in the early stages of a union organizing drive—the potential for
that collective action to be chilled because of employees’ reasonable fear of
employer retaliation would be too great. 30
Accordingly, as one would expect, certain surveillance activities by
employers have been illegal since the earliest days of the NLRA. In 1938, the
Supreme Court considered an employer’s appeal from an NLRB unfair labor
practice finding that related in part to the company’s “employment of industrial
spies and undercover operatives.” 31 The NLRB decision offered more detail
about what that “employment of industrial spies” entailed:
[Consolidated] engaged the detective services of Railway Audit and Inspection
Company . . . from October 1933 through October 1936. . . . services rendered

27. As this heading suggests, this Article does not address any other sources of law that could
potentially bear on the employment relationship, such as privacy torts or the Stored
Communications Act.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). (Employees who are not covered by the NLRA, such as public
sector workers, or agricultural or domestic employees, may receive similar protection under state
law. However, these laws are largely outside of the scope of this Article. Public sector workers may
also receive protection from surveillance under the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution).
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 765 (2010) (holding that city’s review of police officer’s
text messages on department-issued cell phone was a search that was covered by the Fourth
Amendment, but City’s search was reasonable). But see Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace
Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277 (2012) (the “understanding that public employees have more
privacy protection in the workplace than their private-sector counterparts has been placed in
considerable doubt.”). On the other hand, values such as public accountability, public safety, or the
need to check the coercive power of the state may justify certain intrusions that would be
unpalatable (if not illegal) in the private sector. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #7, 34 PERI
¶ 178 at *1 (Ill. Lab. Rel. Bd., June 5, 2018), 2018 WL 3062486 (discussing whether public
employer must bargain over police body-worn cameras); In re. Belleville Educ. Ass’n, No. A-295615T3, 2018 WL 3421392 at *3–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 16, 2018) (discussing whether
public employer must bargain over audio and video recording devices intended to help with
responses to school shootings).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
30. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Econ. Pol’y Inst., Briefing Paper 235, No Holds Barred: The
Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing 27 (2009), https://www.epi.org/files/page//pdf/bp235.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPL7-AG4E].
31. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 215 (1938).
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. . . included investigation of the union activities of [Consolidated’s] employees.
Frequently [Consolidated] would send circulars, leaflets, and other literature to
the Inspection Company for investigation by its detectives. Among the various
types of literature . . . were included the circulars and leaflets of the Independent
Brotherhood [of Utility Employees], some of which contained the names of the
leaders of that organization. Detectives . . . also covered several of the meetings
and conventions of the Independent Brotherhood throughout the year 1935. . . .
. . . [D]etectives trailed Stephen L. Solosy . . . and Philemon Ewing, both
organizers for the Independent Brotherhood . . . . The detective who trailed
Solosy was given a picture of him and told to trial him, which he did for two
days . . . .Solosy was unaware that he was being shadowed, but Ewing was
exasperated by the ineptitude of the detective who trailed him . . . . Both Solosy
and Ewing were discharged on January 17, 1936. 32

The Court agreed that the NLRB could bar the company from continuing to use
“outside investigating agencies.” 33 However, perhaps because the Railway
Audit and Inspection Company detectives’ surveillance work was so extensive,
neither the Court nor the NLRB discussed the scope or even the purposes of the
NLRA’s protection against employer surveillance.
Later cases and commentators sketched out the contours of that protection
in greater detail. An employer’s direct observation of union activity—here, think
of a supervisor recording names of employees wearing union insignia on their
clothing at work, or keeping close watch on a picket line—becomes unlawful “if
the observation goes beyond casual and becomes unduly intrusive.” 34 “Indicia
of coerciveness include the ‘duration of the observation, the employer’s distance
from employees while observing them, and whether the employer engaged in
other coercive behavior during its observation.’” 35 Examples of surveillance that
the NLRB has held violate the NLRA include watching employees with
binoculars, 36 watching union activity on a daily basis and for hours at a time, 37
posting guards in previously unguarded areas, 38 photographing or videotaping
employees and monitoring their phone calls in response to union activity, 39 and

32. In re. Consol. Edison Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 71, 94–95 (1937).
33. Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 217.
34. Kenworth Truck Co., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 497, 501 (1999).
35. Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC, 366 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 2018 WL 2148472 at *5 (May 8, 2018)
(quoting Alladin Gaming, LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 585, 586 (2005)).
36. Cook Family Foods, Ltd., 311 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1301 (1993).
37. NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 455 (4th Cir. 1944).
38. S.J.P.R., Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 172, 189 (1992).
39. Dep’t Store Div. of the Dayton Hudson Corp., 316 N.L.R.B. 477, 478 (1995); F.W.
Woolworth Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1197 (1993). The NLRB has held that photographing or
videotaping employees’ statutorily protected activities is a per se violation of the NLRA, unless the
employer can “provide a solid justification” that the photography was required because of
anticipated misconduct. Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC, 366 N.L.R.B. No. 82 at *5–6 (quoting Nat’l Steel
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a manager beginning a new practice of sitting with employees at lunch or during
breaks. 40
But surveillance qualifies as an unfair labor practice only if it involves more
than an employer happening to see union activity taking place in public or in the
open at work. Rather, the NLRB asks whether the employer’s conduct is “out of
the ordinary” in a way that would tend “to interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees[‘]” collective action. 41 There are two significant aspects to this test:
first, it is objective, requiring the NLRB to assess whether the challenged
surveillance would interfere with, restrain, or coerce a reasonable or typical
employee’s protected concerted activity. 42 Second, it allows the employer to set
the baseline: in general, employers can continue practices adopted before
employees began to engage in concerted activity (usually a union drive), even if
those practices later have the effect of allowing the employer to observe
concerted activity once it begins. 43 This means employers may implement
surveillance programs for reasons other than deterring union organizing, such as
promoting productivity or maintaining security. For example, the NLRB
rejected the contention that an employer engaged in unlawful surveillance when,
during an organizing drive, it slightly expanded an existing “good-night” policy,
which entailed a member of senior management standing at the door at the end
of the workday to ensure that employees had exited the building and that their
packages were appropriately sealed to prevent theft. 44 The “good-night policy,”
wrote an administrative law judge in an opinion adopted by the NLRB, could
not reasonably deter concerted activity because it was “a practice with which the
employees had become fully familiar.” 45
Employees need not be aware of employer surveillance for it to violate the
NLRA. For example, in one of the earliest cases dealing with this issue, the
Ninth Circuit simply resorted to the text of the NLRA to affirm the Board’s
decision that surreptitious surveillance could be an unfair labor practice even
though employees did not discover it until after the fact, because “[c]asual
examination of the dictionary discloses that a person may be interfered with,
restrained, or coerced without knowing it.” 46 Additionally, the NLRB will find
& Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 499, 499 (1997). But cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 98,
101 (3d. Cir. 1982) (rejecting the NLRB’s per se approach in photographing cases).
40. Elano Corp., 216 N.L.R.B. 691, 695 (1975); Hawthorn Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 251, 251 (1967).
See also Aladdin Gaming, 345 N.L.R.B. 585, 586-87 (2005) (discussing these and other cases).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012) (defining as unfair labor practice employer “interfere[nce]
with, restrain[t], or coerc[ion]” with employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity); Metal
Industries Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1523, 1523 (1980) (routine or casual observation of workplace
activity does not rise to the level of unlawful surveillance).
42. The Broadway, 267 N.L.R.B. 385, 400 (1983).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 389–90.
45. Id. at 400.
46. NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass’n, 122 F.2d 368, 376 (9th Cir. 1941).
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an unfair labor practice when an employer attempts (but fails) to watch its
employees’ union activity, such as by following an employee in the hope of
learning the location of a union meeting that the employee does not ultimately
attend. 47 And it is also an unfair labor practice when an employer deliberately
creates the impression of surveillance—even if no information is actually
collected—such as by placing in a break room a security camera that does not
contain a tape or that turns out to be broken, or having a supervisor sit in a car
while observing union activity and talking on the phone, even if the conversation
is not a report on the union activity. 48 “The test in determining whether a
statement constitutes creating the impression of surveillance is whether the
employees could reasonably assume from the employer’s statements or conduct
that their activities had been placed under surveillance.” 49
Taken as a whole, the NLRB’s surveillance doctrine reveals at least two
general purposes. First, increased employer surveillance in response to union
activity can have a chilling effect on that activity because employees will
reasonably fear that the surveillance has been implemented in order to facilitate
later retaliation by the employer—this explains why employers can violate the
NLRA simply by creating the impression of surveillance, but without engaging
in it. 50 Second, employer surveillance can give employers an unfair advantage
in opposing an organizing drive, or facilitate other unfair labor practices,
including retaliation against union supporters. This explains why employers’
surreptitious surveillance also violates the NLRA.
Although the tools available for employer surveillance have changed
significantly, the NLRB’s approach to surveillance cases has mostly remained
the same. For example, the NLRB folded videography into its rule on employer
photography of concerted activity without modifying the rule to account for
differences between the two technologies. 51 In another case involving new(er)
surveillance technology, MEK Arden, a supervisor (erroneously) told an
employee that the workplace had voice-activated cameras, leading the employee
to believe that her speech and that of other employees would be recorded. 52 The
NLRB concluded that “suggesting to an employee that the cameras were being
used to monitor their activities” was an unfair labor practice. 53

47. NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 967 (4th Cir. 1985).
48. Cal. Acrylic Indus., 322 N.L.R.B. 41, 59 (1996) (“whether a video tape was actually in
Saldana’s video camera or whether he actually pressed down on the record button . . . the ‘chilling
effect’ of such on Respondent’s employees’ Section 7 rights was the same.”). See also Eddyleon
Chocolate Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 887, 887–88 (1991).
49. MEK Arden, LLC, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 2017 WL 3229289 at *19 (July 25, 2017).
50. Cal. Acrylic Indus., 322 N.L.R.B. at 59.
51. F.W. Woolworth Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1197 (1993).
52. MEK Arden, LLC, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 109 at *18–19.
53. Id. at 19.
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The NLRB’s most significant recent discussion of the intersection of
surveillance and new technology came in a case known as Purple
Communications, in which the NLRB held that employees had a presumptive
right to use their work-issued email accounts to engage in collective action under
certain conditions, including that employees limit their email concerted activity
to non-working time. 54 Of course, as discussed above, many employers already
monitor their employees’ use of email, creating a potential conflict between
employees’ concerted activity and employers’ desire to implement surveillance
measures designed to monitor productivity. 55 The Purple Communications
majority acknowledged as much—but stated that such a conflict could be
resolved by applying its existing law on employee surveillance: “We are
confident, however, that we can assess any surveillance allegations by the same
standards that we apply to alleged surveillance in the bricks-and-mortar
world.” 56 Then, the NLRB added the following:
An employer’s monitoring of electronic communications on its email system
will similarly be lawful so long as the employer does nothing out of the ordinary,
such as increasing its monitoring during an organizational campaign or focusing
its monitoring efforts on protected conduct or union activists. Nor is an employer
ordinarily prevented from notifying its employees, as many employers also do
already, that it monitors (or reserves the right to monitor) computer and email
use for legitimate management reasons and that employees may have no
expectation of privacy in their use of the employer’s email system. 57

There are at least two ways to view this brief discussion. One is as a practical
suggestion about how the NLRB would respond to an as-yet-theoretical problem
raised in the context of a highly controversial case. But the other is as a missed
opportunity: the NLRB could have signaled its openness to considering whether
a law of employer surveillance that was designed for the real world is really
appropriate for the digital world. In line with the second view, Professor Jeffrey
Hirsch praised the main result in Purple Communications, but criticized the
discussion of surveillance: “email monitoring can provide employers with
information that is useful for legal attempts to thwart collective action . . . . while
electronic collective action provides many benefits to employees, it also exposes
those efforts in ways that traditional coordination does not.” 58 Thus, Hirsch
identified three specific problems with the NLRB’s approach: first, that
“[u]nlike picketing or other types of public acts, there is typically a veneer of
privacy that attaches to email;” second, that the NLRB’s approach effectively

54. Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 1050, 1064–65 (2014).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1065.
58. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 921,
954 (2015).
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encourages employers to prophylactically adopt a broad monitoring policy; and
third, that by carefully monitoring and searching their employees’ computer use,
employers might be able to discover information such as passwords to protected
social media sites—which might in turn lead the employer to discover additional
information about employees’ concerted activity, among other private
information. 59
Because of Purple Communication’s context, the problems that Hirsch
identified involve employers’ monitoring of employees’ computer use. But other
types of new surveillance technology will raise equally sticky problems. I
describe some of those problems in the next section, but the bottom line is that
the NLRB’s current approach, which essentially ignores surveillance adopted
for purposes such as deterring theft or promoting productivity, is not up to
dealing with emerging intrusive forms of workplace surveillance.
I. UPDATING LABOR LAW TO RESPOND TO SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
Some of the implications of surveillance technology for employers looking
to prevent their employees from unionizing or engaging in other collective
action are readily apparent. For example, Walmart’s patented audio surveillance
system, if implemented, would allow the company to listen not just for bagging
speed, but also for employees talking about the Organization United for Respect
at Walmart (“OUR Walmart”), which is sponsored by the United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union. 60 Add to that Walmart’s well-known
history of anti-union tactics (including employee surveillance), 61 and one can
easily foresee that Walmart workers might curtail any talk of OUR Walmart, or
even of any dissatisfaction with their treatment by their employer—even though
the NLRA protects such talk, provided that it is confined to non-working time. 62
Yet, as discussed above, the NLRA would have little to say about Walmart’s
decision to implement a surveillance system for the purposes of productivity
enhancement, even though chilling employees’ collective action would be a
foreseeable result.
Newer methods and habits of work could also extend this chilling effect
beyond the workplace’s physical boundaries. For example, when employers
issue computers and cell phones to their workforce, they may either welcome or
tolerate the use of these devices for employees’ personal communications.
59. Id. at 957–58.
60. See Susan Berfield, How Walmart Keeps an Eye on Its Massive Workforce, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-walmart-union-sur
veillance/ [https://perma.cc/F2EJ-NF34].
61. Id. See also Steven Greenhouse, How Walmart Persuades Its Workers Not to Unionize,
THE ATLANTIC (June 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/howwalmart-convinces-its-employees-not-to-unionize/395051/
[https://perma.cc/A23A-WDZK]
(describing Walmart’s history of anti-union activity).
62. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 (1945).
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Employees could reasonably see this practice as an office “perk,” but it also
makes communicating free from employer surveillance difficult. Even if some
employees are meticulous about using non-work devices, email addresses, and
networks when typing something they don’t want the boss to know about, the
likelihood that everyone else with whom they communicate will follow the same
protocol is low. The result will be that employers who are determined to learn
what their employees are doing and saying will almost certainly succeed—and,
perhaps more important, savvy employees will know that they cannot expect
their communications to remain secret from their employers. Relatedly, where
employees carry smartphones or other GPS-enabled devices, they could fear that
their employers will track who attends union meetings, or even which employees
get together outside of work, making informal networks among employees
visible to the employer.
There is also the possibility that employer surveillance will generally deter
employees from talking with each other during the work day, even when their
conversations would not relate to working conditions or collective action. This
deterrence could result from employer audio recording, or from strict
productivity quotas or monitoring intended to prevent “goofing off.” One
predictable result would be that employees will not get to know each other very
well. If that happens, there could be ramifications of many sorts—employees
might enjoy their jobs less, their well-being might suffer, and they may become
less likely to turn to each other to discuss workplace problems. Professor
Michael Oswalt has discussed the importance of trust among workers as a
prerequisite to collective action of any sort, but especially the spur-of-themoment protests that are more likely in un-organized workplaces than unionized
ones. 63 As he put it, “the connective quality that matters most [to
“improvisational” collective action] is trust, specifically a special sort of trust—
the kind built up over time through repeated, relaxed, informal interactions.” 64
Finally, a combination of pre-hire personality tests and workplace happiness
monitoring could help employers avoid hiring the sort of worker who might be
prone to collective action in the first place, and then respond on an individual
basis to employees who become unhappy during their tenure, either by
improving their pay or other working conditions, or by firing them. The net
result will be that worker grievances will become less likely to catalyze
collective action that could lead to improvements for all of an employer’s
employees. Developing this argument, Nathan Newman has persuasively
reasoned both that personality tests and workplace monitoring are likely to result

63. See Michael M. Oswalt, The Right to Improvise in Low-Wage Work, 38 CARDOZO L. REV.
959, 998–99 (2017).
64. Id. at 999.
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in lower pay for workers as a whole, and that these techniques may violate the
NLRA’s prohibitions on polling employees about their union sympathies. 65
But if a union drive does begin—as occurred among Uber drivers in
Seattle—the employer would be able to easily reach employees at home by
sending notifications containing the employers’ messages, links to podcasts
discussing the union drive from the employer’s perspective, and more to
employees’ devices. 66 While an employer’s physical visit to an employee’s
home could be deemed a reason to order a new union election, the same is not
(yet) true of an electronic visit—yet the electronic visit, perhaps even more than
the physical visit, could arrive at a time when the worker was especially
susceptible to suggestion, and with content the worker is especially likely to
accept. 67
What could labor law do about all this? The answer to this question is
multifaceted, but one aspect is clear: the NLRB should not simply apply case
law that was developed for detectives holding clipboards, or even workplace
cameras, to the emerging workplace surveillance technology discussed in Part
II. As Professor Hirsch outlined in the context of employee email monitoring,
the problem with that approach is that it does not grapple with the fact that
employers can learn vastly more information, and more useful information,
about their employees’ actual and potential collective action through these new
technologies than through previous methods of workplace surveillance. 68
Charles Craver has proposed that employers should be required to disclose
the extent of their workplace surveillance and the specific activities that this
surveillance is intended to deter, and also that monitoring authority be vested in
particular pre-designated individuals, who are in turn subject to strict rules about
what they can disclose about what they see or hear, and to whom. 69 And Ariana
Levinson has suggested a set of rules designed to mimic the protections that
apply to workers who are already unionized and living under a typical collective
bargaining agreement. 70 These include notice of monitoring under most
circumstances and limits on surreptitious monitoring, and allowing employees
to respond before imposing discipline based on activity learned through
65. Nathan Newman, Reengineering Workplace Bargaining: How Big Data Drives Lower
Wages and How Reframing Labor Law Can Restore Information Equality in the Workplace, 85 U.
CIN. L. REV. 693, 738–39 (2017).
66. See Heidi Groover, As Seattle Uber Drivers Try to Unionize, the Company Doubles Down
on a Scare Campaign, THE STRANGER (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/
12/07/24731875/can-uber-convince-its-drivers-they-dont-need-a-union [https://perma.cc/6PCD-9
NGL].
67. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1017 (2014).
68. Hirsh, supra note 60 at 955–56.
69. Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employers, Employees, and Labor
Organizations, 66 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1076 (2006).
70. Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 629, 656 (2009).
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surveillance. Although these proposals were designed with general employee
privacy concerns in mind, rather than a focus on preserving the conditions
necessary for union organizing, they could also help curb the chilling effects that
employer surveillance can have on collective action.
In addition, the NLRB (or Congress) should consider an additional measure,
designed to balance employer needs and real concerns about chilling employees’
collective action in the context of specific workplaces. 71 Specifically, the NLRB
should adopt a new set of presumptions for evaluating intrusive employer
surveillance that predictably balance employer and employee needs. 72 Under
such a framework, the NLRB would presumptively bar some of the most
intrusive workplace surveillance techniques unless employers can show they are
necessary because of special circumstances. Conversely, the framework would
presumptively permit less intrusive forms of surveillance under two conditions:
first, the employer’s demonstration of a legitimate purpose for their
implementation; and second, that employees cannot show that they were adopted
or are being deployed to deter protected concerted activity.
II. CONCLUSION
The digital revolution is not yet done transforming work, and it is
unpredictable where the combination of emerging automation and artificial
intelligence theories will lead. But labor law’s approach to policing workplace
surveillance is not yet ready to meet these challenges. In particular, the NLRA’s
current indifference to employers’ baseline choices regarding workplace
surveillance in non-union workplaces is inadequate, because new surveillance
methods yield much more and much better information for employers aiming to
nip workers’ concerted activity in the bud. An updated legal regime would at
minimum involve notice rights, but should also force employers to justify their
surveillance choices, and facilitate worker input into those choices.

71. The proposal is laid out here only briefly, to be elaborated in future work.
72. This proposed framework is modeled on the presumptions initially created in the Republic
Aviation case and later elaborated by the NLRB. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793 (1945).

